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Introduction
Volume-based payment schemes for health care provision have become increasingly popular among policy makers. 1 Critics argue that such schemes lead to over-provision of health care and possibly supplier-induced demand, which result in excessive health expenditures without much gains to patients'health. However, proponents argue that the provider incentives generated by volume-based payment schemes are necessary for an e¢ cient supply of health care and result in substantial health gains to patients. Knowledge about (whether and) how health care providers respond to …nancial incentives is therefore of great importance for the design of health policy.
In this paper we study the impact of fee-for-service payments on the provision of health care
by General Practitioners (GPs). While there is a large economic literature on this topic, our paper makes use of a unique data set and o¤ers a novel approach to identifying the e¤ects of fee changes on GPs'provision of care. From administrative registry data, we obtain a panel data set covering all fee-for-service payments to GPs in Norway over the six year period 2006-11. To identify the e¤ect of fee changes on the GPs'provision of care, we exploit variation related to specialisation in general medicine, which entitles the GPs to a higher consultation fee leaving the fees for other services unchanged. Since GPs become specialists at di¤erent dates, this approach gives us variation in the fee schedule over time and across GPs in terms of absolute and relative fee levels. To identify the causal e¤ect of the fee-for-service payment, we focus on the GPs' health care provision in a narrow time window around the date of specialisation. In this short period it is not likely that much else than the change in the consultation fee a¤ects the GPs' treatment decisions.
Estimating a GP …xed-e¤ect model controlling for observable GP and patient characteristics, our results show that the GPs change their treatment behaviour drastically after receiving the specialist certi…cation. In particular, we …nd that the higher consultation fee associated with specialisation leads to a strong, positive e¤ect on the number of consultations, but has a negative e¤ect on treatment intensity (measured by laboratory tests, medical procedures or prolonged consultations). Despite the reduction in treatment intensity, we …nd that the total income per consultation increases, which implies that the direct e¤ect of the higher consultation fee dominates.
According to our theory model, these results are consistent with treatment decisions by pro…t-motivated GPs. A purely altruistic GP, which is a perfect agent for the patients, would not change treatment behaviour according to changes in the fee-for-service schedule. However, we show that a (partially) pro…t-motivated GP responds to a higher consultation fee by treating more patients, but with a lower treatment intensity, given that physician income e¤ects are su¢ ciently small. The reason for this is two-fold. First, a higher consultation fee implies a change in relative prices (fees), making consultations more pro…table relative to services related to the intensity of treatment. Second, the extra time spent on consultations implies that the marginal cost of medical treatments becomes higher due to the GPs'time constraint. In other words, the change in the fee schedule due to specialisation has a positive e¤ect on the extensive margin (the number of patients treated), but a negative e¤ect on the intensive margin (the amount of treatment per patient).
Having found that …nancial incentives in ‡uence the GPs medical treatment, a natural question is whether this has any impact on patients'health outcomes. Using emergency care centre visits shortly after a GP consultation as a measure of adverse health outcomes, we …nd no (positive or negative) e¤ects after the GPs become specialists. In terms of policy implications, this result suggests that the higher consultation fee for specialists has a negative welfare e¤ect since it increase the medical expenditures signi…cantly without improving patients'health. However, our measure of health e¤ects may be imprecise, implying that this particular result must be interpreted carefully. 2 As mentioned above, there is a vast empirical literature on physician responses to …nancial incentives. The strand of this literature more closely related to the present paper is the one analysing the e¤ect of fee changes on physicians'supply of medical services. The overall picture from this literature is somewhat mixed, although many studies …nd a positive supply response to higher fees. For example, studying the e¤ects of changes in US Medicare fees, Hadley and Reschovsky (2006) …nd that a higher fee increases both the number of patients treated and service intensity. Similarly, Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) The results are considerably weaker (and more mixed) regarding cross-price e¤ects on the supply of medical services; that is, the extent to which a fee change for a particular service leads to adjustments in the supply of other services. For example, the aforementioned study by A related strand of this literature consists of papers studying the e¤ects of di¤erent physician payment schemes, usually fee-for-service contracts versus …xed-salary contracts. Also here the results are somewhat mixed. Using Canadian data, Devlin and Sarma (2008) …nd that feefor-service leads to more patient visits, whereas Sørensen and Grytten (2003) …nd that fee-forservice increases service production by 20-40% in Norway, compared with a …xed-salary contract. This literature, and our paper, also relates more broadly to the huge literature on supplierinduced demand (SID). Some early studies in this literature, e.g., Rice (1983 Rice ( , 1984 , found quite strong evidence of a backward bending supply curve (indicating large income e¤ects). Another example is Gruber and Owing (1996) , who found that reduction in fertility rates in the US led to an increase in (higher-paid) caesarean section delivery and interpreted this as supplierinducement in response to a negative income shock. However, later studies reveal more mixed …ndings. For example, a series of papers on Norwegian data (Grytten et al, 1995; 2001; Carlsen et al., 2003 Carlsen et al., , 2011 report little or no evidence of SID.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a theory model for analysing the e¤ects of fee-for-service payments on GPs' provision of medical treatment. In Section 3 we present the institutional features of the Norwegian primary health care market.
In Section 4 data and some descriptive statistics are presented. In Section 5 we explain our empirical strategy, while in Section 6 we report the results. In Section 7 we conduct several sensitivity tests checking the robustness of our results, whereas in Section 8 we analyse potential e¤ects on patients'health outcomes. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
A theoretical framework
Consider a physician that faces excess demand for medical treatment and can therefore freely choose the number of consultations o¤ered per period. 4 Let n be the number of consultations and let s be intensity of treatment, such as consultation length, number of laboratory tests and procedures, etc. Suppose that n and s are choice variables in the following optimisation problem for the physician:
where b ( ) is a patient bene…t function that is increasing and strictly concave in treatment intensity s, u ( ) is the physician's utility of income, and c ( ) is a strictly convex physician e¤ort function, which depends on the time T spent by the physician on n consultations with treatment intensity s. If we let t n measure the time spent per (standard length) consultation and t s the time spent per unit of treatment intensity, the total time spent by the physician is given by T = (t n + t s s) n. The (regulated) prices the physician receives per consultation and per unit of treatment intensity are given by p and q, respectively. Finally, the parameter 2 [0; 1] measures the degree to which the physician cares about patient bene…t relative to own income. The case of = 1, in which the physician decides on the optimal treatment supply (n and s) solely by trading o¤ patient bene…t against costs of treatment, can be interpreted as the physician being a perfect agent for the patient. At the other extreme, where = 0, the physician does not care about patient bene…t and decides on the optimal treatment supply by trading o¤ own (utility of) revenues against costs. By assuming that the utility function u ( ) is weakly concave we also allow for the possibility of income e¤ects (if u 00 ( ) < 0) on the physician's decision making.
The physician's optimal choices, n and s , are implicitly given by the following pair of …rst-order conditions:
We are interested in determining the e¤ect on the optimal solution of a change in the price per consultation, p. By totally di¤erentiating (2)- (3) and applying Cramer's rule, the e¤ect of a change in the consultation price on the number of consultations is given by
where := @ 2 =@n 2 @ 2 =@s 2 @ 2 =@n@s 2 is positive by the second-order condition.
Similarly, the e¤ect of a change in p on the physician's choice of treatment intensity is given by 5
Based on (4)- (5) we derive the following results:
Proposition 1 (i) If the physician is a perfect agent for the patient ( = 1), a change in the price per consultation has no e¤ ect on the number of consultations and the treatment intensity o¤ ered by the physician;
(ii) If the physician is not a perfect agent for the patient ( < 1), and if physician income e¤ ects are su¢ ciently small, a higher (lower) price per consultation leads to more (fewer)
consultations and a lower (higher) treatment intensity.
If the physician is a perfect agent for the patient, the optimal supply of consultations and 5 In both (4) and (5), we use the fact that, from (3), the optimal solution is characterised by
6 treatment intensity depend only on a trade o¤ between patient utility and treatment costs, neither of which depends on the price the physician receives per consultation. Consequently, changes in the physician payment has no e¤ect on treatment decisions. On the other hand, if the physician also takes into account own revenue, the optimal decision is partly determined by the marginal revenue of increasing the number of consultation versus increasing the treatment intensity, which in turn depends on the relative prices, p=q. A higher price per consultation (p)
increases the marginal revenue of consultations and therefore induces a pro…t-oriented physician to increase the number of consultations o¤ered. The extra time spent on more consultations implies that the marginal cost of treatment intensity increases, which, all else equal, leads to a lower chosen treatment intensity.
The above described substitution e¤ects will determine the physician response to a consultation price increase if the income e¤ects are su¢ ciently small (i.e., u 00 ( ) is su¢ ciently small in absolute value). However, since a higher consultation price also directly increases the physician's income, the e¤ect on the optimal choices of n and s is generally ambiguous in the presence of su¢ ciently large income e¤ects, as illustrated by the second term in the square brackets of (4) and (5), respectively. However, from (5) we see that a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for @s =@p < 0 is t n =t s > p=q. Thus, the sign of @s =@p is always negative, even in the presence of income e¤ects, if the relative price of consultations is not too high compared with relative time costs. If, in addition, the physician is su¢ ciently pro…t-oriented (i.e., if is su¢ ciently low), the sign of @n =@p is also positive regardless of income e¤ects, as can be veri…ed from (4).
Institutional background
Norway has a public health care system …nanced through general taxation, i.e., National Health Service (NHS), where the state is responsible for secondary care and municipalities for primary care. GPs need a license to set up a practice and a contract with a municipality in order to o¤er services to patients within the NHS. 6 The number of GPs within each municipality is regulated by the Directorate of Health which also certi…es the GPs with licenses. Thus, entry of physicians on the primary health care market is highly regulated in Norway.
There are more than 4000 public GPs with a municipality contract (called "fastleger" in Norwegian). All individuals in Norway have the right to be listed with a public GP in their municipality of residence. Individuals can switch GP (at most twice per calender year) within the municipality. 7 However, GPs can potentially turn down new patients if their patient list is full. GPs are required to have at least 500 patients, but are not allowed to have more than 2500 patients. Within these boundaries, the GPs can actually decide the size of their list, and as long as their list is not full (closed), they are obliged to accept all new patients.
Almost all (95 percent of) GPs in Norway are self-employed with private practises. 8 Thus,
the GPs are residual claimants of any surpluses (or de…cits) related to treating patients within the NHS. However, prices are regulated (or set in negotiations between the government and the medical association), and cannot be set by the individual GP. The GPs receive third-party payments that are a combination of capitation and fee-for-service. The capitation part is paid by the municipalities, and the GPs are paid a ‡at payment per individual on their list (around NOK 400 per year). The fee-for-service part is paid by the National Insurance Scheme, and the GPs receive a fee per consultation and per medical procedure.
GPs may decide to become specialists in general medicine. This requires (at least) four years full-time GP practise, two years of training and course work, as well as a certain level of practise from working at both acute and specialist care units. Around 2/3 (approximately 2400) of the GPs are certi…ed as specialists in general medicine. The specialist certi…cate has to be renewed every …fth year, which means that some GPs may lose their certi…cation if they do not ful…ll the criteria (e.g., not su¢ cient GP practice). When GPs become a specialist in general medicine they are entitled to a substantially higher consultation fee, while the fees for the residual GP services, such as laboratory tests and medical procedures, are left unchanged.
The fee schedule for GP services is regulated yearly by July 1. In Figure 1 we show the development in nominal fees for GP services over the period studied. The consumer price index is included for comparison. 9 We see that the basic consultation fee has not quite caught up with consumer prices, whereas the additional consultation fees, both for prolonged consultations and 7 Of course, if individuals move to another municipality they are also allowed to switch GP across municipalities. 8 The residual …ve percent of the GPs are basically publicly employed with regular salary contracts. 9 The consumer price index is from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no).
8 consultations with a GP specialist, have risen sharply during our sample period. 10 [ Figure 1 ]
Data and descriptive statistics
In order to examine whether GPs respond to …nancial incentives, we apply Norwegian administrative registry data from several sources. From the KUHR register, we obtain information about the fee-for-service payments to GPs from the National Insurance Scheme. 11 Since there are speci…c tari¤s for each service, we observe the medical treatment provided to each patient, including medical procedures, laboratory tests, prolonged consultations, etc. We also observe the number of patient visits and the GP's total income per visit, as well as patient characteristics, such as age, gender and diagnosis.
To identify whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine or when he or she becomes such a specialist, we make us of the fee-for-service information in the KUHR register. Since the GP specialists are entitled to an additional consultation fee, we observe whether the GP is a specialist or the date the GP e¤ectively becomes a specialist. GP characteristics, such as age and gender, are found in the GP database (Fastlegedatabasen), which also includes yearly information about the GP's patient list, such as number of patients enlisted and vacant slots.
The data sources mentioned above cover all GPs and virtually all GP consultations and services rendered. 12 We apply information for the years 2006-2011. From these data sources, we construct a GP panel data set with monthly observations. Using the information about GP's specialist status, we de…ne three categories of GPs: the "Always", "Never" and "Becomes" specialist groups. In the "Becomes" specialist group, we restrict the sample to GPs that have practiced actively at least one month before and at least one month after specialist certi…cation is granted. In a sensitivity test, we use a fourth category consisting of GPs who lose their specialist status for a temporary period.
1 0 The fees for laboratory tests and medical producedures are numerous and therefore not possible to depict over time. 1 1 KUHR (Kontroll og utbetaling av helserefusjon) is a public register administrated by the Norwegian Health Administration (HELFO), which is a subordinate of the Directorate of Health. This register contains also feefor-service payments to other private health care providers such as specialist doctors, dentists, physiotherapists, etc. 1 2 Reimbursement claims are almost exclusively sent electronically. Claims sent on paper are not included in the registry data, but amounted to merely 1 percent of all claims in 2010 (www.ssb.no/helse/statistikker/).
Our two main outcome variables are the number of consultations and treatment intensity.
The former is measured by the variable Visits, which is the monthly number of consultations at the GP's o¢ ce. The latter is captured by three di¤erent variables: (i) LongCons is the proportion of the GP's consultations that exceed 20 minutes; (ii) Labtest is the proportion of consultations where a test is taken 13 ; and (iii) Procedures is the average number of medical procedures performed per consultation. In addition, we construct an outcome variable, Totalfee, which is the average GP payment per consultation, including both the fee-for-service and possible copayments from the patients.
Our explanatory variable of prime interest is Specialist, which takes the value one when the GP is a specialist and zero otherwise. Control variables include GP and patient characteristics.
A description of all variables used in the estimations is found in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 ]
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics by GP category are shown in Table 2 . Our main interest is in the "Becomes" specialist category. During our sample period from 2006 to 2011, 538 GPs obtain specialist certi…cation, which entitles them to a higher consultation fee. When comparing means before and after specialist certi…cation is obtained, we observe that "Becomes" specialists have more consultations per month, but o¤er lower treatment intensity. The increase in Totalfee (around NOK 105) exceeds the extra consultation fee that the GPs can charge when becoming specialists (on average around NOK 72). Notice that these …gures partly re ‡ect the increase in the consultation fee over time (as seen in Figure 1 ), since we compare the GPs' total income per consultation before and after becoming a specialist. We also observe that the number of patients enlisted becomes slightly higher after specialisation, whereas the characteristics of the patient population seem to be fairly constant.
[ Table 2 ] For comparison we also include the descriptive statistics for the "Always"and "Never"spe-cialist group. The most striking di¤erence between these two groups is that "Always" specialists have more patients enlisted and more consultations per month. The "Never" specialists, in turn, o¤er more long consultations and medical procedures. As expected, "Always" specialists have a higher income per consultation, but the average di¤erence of NOK 38 is less than the extra specialist fee they receive (on average NOK 72). A similar pattern is present for the "Temporary non-specialist" category.
These …ndings may suggest that the GPs respond to the changes in the fee schedule related to specialist status. However, it may also re ‡ect supply-side factors, such as the GPs'skills in medical treatment due to specialisation, or demand-side factors, such as size and composition of the patients enlisted by the GP. In order to identify the causal e¤ects of …nancial incentives on GPs'provision of medical care, a key challenge is to control for (observed and unobserved) di¤erences in GP and patient characteristics. As a …rst approach to limit this problem, we focus only on the "Becomes" specialist category.
To study more closely to what extent GPs respond to …nancial incentives, we consider changes in the provision of medical care within a "window" 12 months before and 12 months after specialist status is gained, normalised to the level 12 months before certi…cation. Figure A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
[ Figure 2 and 3 ]
However, a more thorough investigation is needed to account for factors that may a¤ect the GPs' provision of services and possibly coincide with specialist certi…cation, such as demandside factors (e.g., changes in patient population) or supply-side factors (e.g., GP skills in medical treatment). In addition, a possible confounding factor is that becoming a specialist requires time and e¤ort from the GP, which might in ‡uence the provision of medical care during the qualifying period. In the next section, we explain our empirical strategy for dealing with these (and other) issues.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy for identifying the GPs'responses to …nancial incentives is to compare the provision of medical care in a narrow "window"around the date the GP becomes a specialist in general medicine -from three months before to three months after the date of certi…cation.
The identifying assumption is that within such a short period, there are no changes (other than the specialist fee) that cannot be controlled for and that may a¤ect treatment in a signi…cant and systematic manner. Focusing on a short period, we control for all demand and supply changes that may in ‡uence the GPs'health care provision, such as changes the GPs'human capital or the size and composition of the patient population. In this way, we can identify the causal e¤ect of the fee changes on the GPs medical treatment holding all other factors constant.
In the analysis we restrict the sample to the "Becomes" specialist group only, excluding the GPs that are "Always" or "Never" specialists. Since we do not use other GPs as controls, this implies that the counterfactual situation is represented by the "treated" GPs'medical treatment in the period just before their specialist certi…cation. Moreover, since the GPs continuously become specialists at di¤erent dates over the observational period, it is unlikely that other factors coincide with becoming a specialist, and therefore unnecessary to use "Always" or "Never" specialists as a control group. 14 Our empirical strategy ensures internal validity, but may raise a concern about external validity. The GPs that become specialists may di¤er from the non-specialists on unobservable characteristics that can be related to our outcome variables, for instance, regarding pro…t-motivation or degree of altruism. However, as shown in Figure A4 in the Appendix, the large majority (more than 80 percent) of the GPs become specialists during their career, and are thus highly representative for the population of GPs.
Our main speci…cation is a model with …xed-e¤ects at the GP level as presented below, where the subscripts i, j and t represents GP, calender month, and year, respectively:
The dependent variable Y represents the GPs'medical treatment measured by either the number of visits, the treatment intensity (rate of prolonged consultations, rate of laboratory tests, number of medical procedures), or the total fee earned per consultation; see Table 1 for a closer description. When estimating outcomes that re ‡ect treatment intensity, the number of visits is included as control. The parameter of interest is 1 , which represents the change in Y from the pre to the post certi…cation period. The vector GP comprises characteristics of the GP's patient population, including age, gender and comorbidity of visiting patients, and (yearly information about) the number of patients enlisted. The …xed-e¤ect captures time-invariant GP characteristics, whether observable (such as gender, year of birth) or unobservable (e.g., altruism, pro…t-motivation, skills, etc.). Finally, we include month and year dummies to control for seasonal variation and time trends, whereas " is an error term. All models are estimated with robust standard errors.
Results
Becoming a specialist in general medicine substantially increases the fee for consultations (more than 60 percent), but does not a¤ect the fees for other GP services. Thus, the GP specialist status changes both the total and the relative fee payments. As shown in the theory section, the GPs'response to such a change in …nancial incentives depends on the degree of pro…t motivation relative to altruism. If the GP is a perfect agent for the patient, we expect no response to the extra specialist fee for consultation. However, if the GP is (to some extent) motivated by pro…ts, the theory model predicts that the higher consultation fee leads to more consultations and lower treatment intensity, under the assumption of su¢ ciently small income e¤ects.
In our empirical analysis we aim at testing these theoretical predictions by controlling for relevant factors other than …nancial incentives that might a¤ect the GPs'treatment decisions.
Our main results are reported in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 ]
13
The results show that GPs who become specialists change their service pattern profoundly from three month prior to certi…cation to three month after certi…cation. We estimate the impact of specialist status for …ve di¤erent outcomes reported in separate columns. After obtaining specialist certi…cation, the GPs increase the number of visits per month by 19:5 on average, but reduce the treatment intensity per visit: the rate of prolonged consultations and laboratory tests are decreased by 3:2 and 1:0 percentage points, respectively, while the average number of medical procedures per consultation falls by about 0:02. Despite the decrease in treatment intensity, the total fee per consultation rises (with about NOK 61). Thus, the increase on consultation fee due to specialisation dominates the reduction in treatment intensity. Some of these e¤ects are small in absolute values, but compared to pre-certi…cation levels of the "Becomes" group, they are of considerable magnitude. Total fee per consultation rises by 28 percent, the number of visits increases by 9 percent, and treatment intensity falls by 2 10 percent depending on which outcome is considered. Except for lab tests, all e¤ects mentioned above are statistically signi…cant at least at the one percent level.
Since we apply a …xed-e¤ect model, the estimated parameters for our variables show how individual GPs on average respond to changes over time. From Table 3 , we see that the e¤ects of patient population characteristics (i.e., age, gender and comorbidity) are mostly insigni…cant and/or small. This is as expected given the small variation in patient population from the preto the post-certi…cation period.
7 Sensitivity analysis
Narrowing the time window
A potential concern with our empirical strategy is that the GPs expend e¤ort in the precerti…cation period in order to qualify for specialisation. Thus, the …nding that the number of visits increases sharply from three months before to three months after specialist certi…cation could potentially be explained by such time-consuming e¤ort. However, this cannot explain that GPs reduce the treatment intensity after receiving specialisation. Moreover, since the approval of specialisation by the medical association usually takes two to three months, the GPs are not likely to undertake time-consuming training in the short three month period before receiving the certi…cation. To ensure that this not a problem to our results, we conduct a sensitivity test by reducing the time window to one month before and after certi…cation using the same empirical speci…cation as in (6).
[ Table 4 ]
As shown in Table 4 , the results are almost identical to the results using a three month period before and after specialisation. Since the GPs do not expend training e¤ort the month before receiving certi…cation, these results con…rm that the changes in GPs'medical treatment behaviour are due to the total and relative fee changes related to becoming a specialist.
The fee schedule is changed annually by 1st of July. This implies that the GPs that become specialists in June or July are exposed to the revision of the fee schedule in addition to the change in consultation fee for specialists. To check whether our results are a¤ected by this, we exclude all GPs becoming specialist in these two months. From the lower section of Table 4 , we see that the results are almost identical, except for a stronger e¤ect on the number of visits (now 24:6, while before 19:3).
Extending the time window
An interesting question is whether the e¤ects reported in Table 3 are just short term or actually represents a persistent shift in the GPs'provision of health care. To investigate this question, we include observations for the "Becomes specialist"group from three months up to 24 months after certi…cation. Results are reported in Table 5 .
[ Table 5 ]
Although we observe minor changes in the e¤ects as the after-certi…cation period is extended, the results show the same overall picture as described above: after specialist certi…cation, GPs increase their number of visits and decrease treatment intensity. Thus, the results in Table 5 increases our con…dence in the main results that GPs respond to a higher consultation fee due to specialist certi…cation, and that this e¤ect is persistent over time.
Temporary non-specialists
In our data there are some GPs that temporarily lose their specialisation. This enables us to conduct a sensitivity test, where we investigate whether these GPs respond in the same way to …nancial incentives as the "Becomes" specialists. When estimating the e¤ects, we include only GPs who lose their specialist certi…cation and then regain it during our observation period. This gives a sample of 54 GPs, de…ned as the "Temporary non-specialist" category in Section 4.
Since the number of GPs that temporarily lose their specialisation is fairly small, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach with the "Always specialists" as a comparison group representing the counterfactual situation. To identify the e¤ect of fee changes due to (losing) specialisation, we include two dummy variables: (i) NonSpec which takes the value one in the periods when the GPs temporarily lose their specialist certi…cation; and (ii) Post NonSpec which takes the value one in the periods after the GPs regain their specialist certi…cation.
[ Table 6 ]
We …nd that in the period after loss of certi…cation, GPs have fewer consultations and higher treatment intensity than they had when they were remunerated as specialists. These results are consistent with our results reported in Tables 3 and 4 
Patients'health outcomes
Having found that GPs change their medical treatment pattern due to changes in the fee-forservice schedule, a natural question is whether this has as any impact on the patients'health.
To investigate this question, we consider whether the patients receive emergency care shortly after visiting the GP. We believe this measure captures adverse health e¤ects that potentially are due to insu¢ cient treatment by the GPs. In our data we have information about all patient visits at emergency care centres. For all patients we observe the date of the GP visit and the date for emergency care for the patients that receive this. Based on this we de…ne a visit to an emergency care centre within a week (either three or seven days) after a GP visit as an adverse health e¤ect. In the analysis, we use the same speci…cation as in our main model given in (6) using all consultations three months before and after the GPs received their specialist certi…cation. As reported in the table, we consider both the change in the absolute number of emergency visits and the change in the proportion of all consultations that result in an emergency visit within three or seven days after a GP visit.
[ Table 7 ]
As can be seen from the table, we …nd no evidence for adverse health e¤ects due to the change in the GPs'medical treatment. Thus, the GPs'response to the change in the fee schedule does not seem to a¤ect patients negatively. In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that the higher consultation fee has a negative welfare e¤ect since it increase the medical expenditures signi…cantly without resulting in positive health e¤ects for the patients. However, our measure of patient health outcomes is imprecise and may not capture all relevant aspects related to the e¤ect of the medical treatment. Thus, we cannot rule out that the change in the GPs medical treatment after becoming specialists may involve positive (or negative) health e¤ects for their patients.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide evidence that physicians respond to …nancial incentives. Using rich register data, we employ a panel data set covering all patient visits to GPs in Norway over the six year period 2006-11. We take a novel approach to identify the causal e¤ects of changes in the fee schedule on physicians medical treatment by focusing on GPs that become specialists in general medicine and thus are entitled to a higher consultation fee. This approach yields variation in the fee schedule across GPs over time due to the fact that GPs obtain certi…cation at di¤erent dates. Since becoming a specialist is endogenous, we estimate the e¤ects in a narrow time window around the date of specialisation. In this short period it is not likely that much else than the change in the consultation fee a¤ects the GPs'treatment decisions.
Our results show the GPs that become a specialist in general medicine change their treatment behaviour immediately after becoming a specialist. We …nd that the higher consultation fee associated with specialisation leads to a strong positive e¤ect on the number of consultations, but a negative e¤ect on treatment intensity (measured by laboratory tests, medical procedures and prolonged consultations). Despite the reduction in treatment intensity, we …nd that the total income per consultation increases, which implies that the direct e¤ect of the higher consultation fee dominates.
These results are consistent with a theory model with excess demand where the GPs are partly pro…t motivated and income e¤ects are su¢ ciently small. In this setting, a GP would respond to a higher consultation fee by treating more patients, but with a lower intensity of medical treatments for two reasons: First, a higher consultation fee implies a change in relative prices (fees), making consultations more pro…table relative to treatment intensity. Second, the extra time spent on consultations implies that the marginal cost of medical treatments becomes higher due to the GPs'time constraint.
Finally, our empirical analysis …nd no (positive or negative) e¤ect on patients'health outcomes measured by emergency care visits shortly after a GP visit. This result suggests a negative welfare e¤ect due to the large increase in medical expenditures. However, our measure of health e¤ects may be imprecise, implying that the result must be interpreted carefully. Moreover, we do not study the e¤ect of becoming a specialist per se. GPs that undertake specialist training are likely to improve their treatment skills gradually over time. However, we use only specialisation as an instrument for changes in fees, and our analysis does not focus on the social value of specialisation in general medicine.
A Appendix
[ Figure A1 to A4 ] Number of patients listed with GP, in 100s (by 1 January each year) NonSpec 1 in months after a GP in the temporarily non-specialist category loses specialist status Post NonSpec 1 in months after the certification has been regained by a GP in the temporarily non-specialist category Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models are estimated with GP, year and month fixed effects and with the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 3 . Table 5 . GP treatment decisions, analysed over a longer post certification period.
TABLES
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models are estimated with GP, year and month fixed effects and with the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 3 . Table 6 . GP treatment decisions, changes for the "Temporarily non-specialist" category. Total fee and number of visits over time The proportion of GPs who are specialists, by age
